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ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT OVERLOOKED THE INHERENT AMBIGUITY OF
THE "REGULAR USE55 CLAUSE AND ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR FARMERS

Contrary to the first argument in Appellee's Brief, Utah case law as cited by
Farmers, properly read, does not support the notion that the "regular use" phrase
at issue is not ambiguous. Farmers' Brief at 9. The court, in the cited case law,
did not discuss or address in any way the issue of ambiguity, so it is not
"reasonable to assume that the court found the phrase 'regular use5 was not
ambiguous" as Farmers declares. If the question of ambiguity of the 'regular use5
phrase was not addressed in the opinion, then it was not decided. See, e.g. State of
Utah v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, at 1173 (Utah 1985): "the issue was not raised in
Murphy, and the statements relied upon by defendant are merely dicta.55 In the
case at bar, there are not even statements on the issue of ambiguity of the "regular
use'5 phrase that could be read as dicta; there is simply silence on the issue.

Valentine demonstrates ambiguity in the policy at many levels. First, some words
used in the policy, while admittedly not novel or unusual words, are reasonably
susceptible to more than one plausible meaning. Second, the awkward
construction of some subordinate phrases in the sentence contributes to lack of

clarity in the whole. Third, the exclusionary clause, taken as a whole, differs
materially from the statute upon which it relies for support, and thus it exceeds the
strictures of the statutory framework, rendering the policy exclusion inapplicable.
Finally, competent courts have interpreted this same phrase and have reached
different results, not just on the application of facts to the policy, but also on the
meanings of words within the phrase and the meaning of the phrase itself.

A.

The Term Regular Use is Ambiguous

Farmers admits that neither of two Utah cases that considered the "regular use"
phrase address whether the exclusion is ambiguous. Farmers' Brief at 10.
Farmers may not properly use the silence of the cases on that issue as assent to the
position Farmers desires.

Oddly, the authorities and litigants who, like Farmers here, find that the phrase is
not ambiguous, conveniently ignore or do not directly address the many cases that
have held the phrase to be ambiguous, and they overlook decisions of courts which
have found different meanings for the words "regular use". For example, some
courts have found 'regular use5 to mean "normal use for all purposes" see, e.g..
Travelers Indent. Co. v. Hudson, 488 P.2d 1008 (Ariz. App. 1971), or the like,

see Valentine's Brief at 18-19, while other authorities find it to mean recurring
with regularity, or "steady or uniform in course" International Services Ins Co v.
Walther, 463 S.W.2d 774 (Texas Civ. App. 1971).

B.

Valentine Establishes An Ambiguity
1.

Multiple Plausible Readings of a Phrase Establish An Ambiguity

The fact that numerous courts have read the words of the "regular use" exclusion
to mean different things is precisely the requirement for a showing of legal
ambiguity:
An ambiguity in insurance policy language exists only if the
language is fairly or reasonably susceptible to two or more different
but reasonable interpretations or meanings". [16 Williston on
Contracts, 49:17 (4* ed, 2000)]

Further, the Supreme Court of Utah has held that "ambiguous or uncertain
language in an insurance contract that is fairly susceptible to different
interpretations should be construed in favor of coverage." USF&G v Sandt, 854
P.2d 519 (Utah 1993).

The word "regular" is one of the principle hinge words in interpreting the phrase.
Read one way, "regular" means according to a set schedule or routine. It is this

reading of the word "regular" in the context of the policy exclusion that the trial
court adopted: that Valentine had "regular use" of the work truck because she used
it on essentially the same set schedule five days a week. R. 227, Transcript of
Hearing of Ruling at 32-33.

Alternatively, though, "regular" means, ordinary, usual, and customary. It is
plausible to find, on this reading of the word "regular", that Valentine did not have
the "regular use" of her employer's vehicle, in that it was not provided for her use
as she ordinarily or customarily would use her vehicle. That is, the permitted use
of the work truck was not a usual or ordinary or "regular" use of the vehicle,
because it was strictly limited to Valentine's work duties during her work hours.
The vehicle was not available for her full, free, and unfettered use as she ordinarily
or regularly would use her own vehicle. Since the word "regular" as used in the
policy exclusion has at least two plausible meanings, by definition, the phrase is
ambiguous.

2. Cases Holding "Regular Use" Phrase Is Ambiguous Are Applicable

Valentine relies on applicable case law for her assertion that the "regular use"
phrase is ambiguous. Naturally, the cases differ from one another and from the

case at bar in various degrees. Nevertheless, the cases are instructive on the
inquiry in at least two significant respects: 1- for the conclusions they reach, and
2- for the fact that, in reaching different conclusions as to the meaning of the
phrase, they underscore the inherent ambiguity in the policy language.

The fact that various courts have read the words of the "regular use" exclusions to
mean different things is the very essence of a showing of ambiguity. Farmers
focuses on exceptionally narrow distinctions to attempt to dismiss cases that have
stated that the phrase "regular use" is ambiguous. See Farmers5 Brief at 12,
discussing Tillotson v. Farmers, 637 SW 2d 541; Ohio Casualty Ins. Co v.
Travelers Indent. Co., 334 NE2d 1 (Ohio App. 1974), aff d 326 NE2d 263 (Ohio
1975); Ricci v. USF & G, 290 A.2d 408 (RI1972); and Dairyland v. Ward, 517
P.2d 966 (Wash, 1984).

The cases are not as easily distinguishable as Farmers argues. The Ohio Casualty
case provides what Farmers claims is lacking: definition of the two equally
plausible readings of the words "regular use":
Under a General Purpose Test, use is regular if the automobile may
be used for any purpose without restrictions. ... Under a Time
Frequency Test, use is regular if it is frequent or steady and constant
over a substantial period of time. Id.

The Ohio Casualty decision also notes that "regular use is a flexible term to be
defined in the context of its use in an insurance contract, and the factual situation
presented in each case." Id. While the court in Ohio Casualty considered a
garage policy, rather than a family automobile policy, the two key words at issue
there, and here, are clearly the same.

It is true also that the two differing readings of "regular use", as defined by the
Ohio Casualty court, supra, are applied, under different names, by many courts
ruling on a variety of insurance policies, including family auto policies. A line of
case holdings finding regular use to consist of an "unfettered ability to regularly
use a vehicle according to his/her whims, needs or desires," see, e.g., American
States Ins Co. v. Tanner, 563 SE 2d 825 (W.V. 2002) and see, generally,
Valentine's Brief at 18-19, are consistent with Ohio Casualty's "General Purpose
Test". Another line of cases holds "regular use" to be only such use that is "steady
or uniform in course..." International Services Ins Co v. Walther, supra, in effect
adopting a variant of the Ohio Casualty "Time Frequency Test."

At Farmers' behest the trial court defined "regular use" as "calculably in time or
manner, habitual, constant, orderly" and declared the definition absolute. R. 227,
Transcript of Hearing of Ruling at 32, quoting the Concise Oxford Dictionary. In

essence, this finding is an adoption of the Ohio Casualty "Time Frequency Test".
Since no Utah appellate court has addressed the issue of ambiguity of the "regular
use" phrase, it is not only error to claim a variant of the Time Frequency Test
(albeit not by that name) as the governing law, it is also very shortsighted. If a
court were to adopt one of the two interpretations, that court would also need to
concede the presence of at least two plausible meanings. Such concession
manifests the ambiguity as a matter of law.

The Ricci case, supra, is applicable on the facts of the case at bar. Farmers'
incorrectly asserts that the Ricci court focused only on the application to the facts,
rather than the inherent ambiguity of the phrase. In truth the Ricci decision
unequivocally states that the:

'regular use'... phrase is not clear and therefore renders the
policy ambiguous." Id. at 413.

The Dairyland case likewise held the phrase to be ambiguous. The court in that
case declared the phrase to be "ambiguous in a very real sense." Dairylandy supra.

Similarly, the Tillotson case holds the "regular use" phrase to be ambiguous.
Farmers asserts, in error, that Tillotson is the 'only case cited by Plaintiff
[Appellant] that found the language ambiguous". Farmers Brief at 13. Farmers

is flatly wrong in asserting that Tillotson is the "only case" Valentine cites that
found the language ambiguous. Farmers is correct that the Tillotson court does
hold the 'regular use' phrase to be ambiguous.

3. Use of Prepositions "the" and "by" In Policy Contribute To Ambiguity

Farmers argues that Valentine's contentions with regard to the use of the words
"the" and "by" in the policy "are not supported by any case law". But Valentine is
not trying to establish, as a matter of settled precedent, that the words "the" and
"by" of themselves create ambiguity, so case law need not address an argument
regarding those words. Rather, Valentine argues that the two words, in the manner
Farmers chose to add them to the policy exclusion, are unclear, unnecessary, and
needlessly confusing. This policy exclusion's odd use of the prepositions "the"
and "by" may not, of itself constitute legal ambiguity. But, in combination with
the other words of the exclusion phraseology, and in the context of where those
two words are found, undoubtedly they do contribute to the overall ambiguous
nature of the policy exclusion.

II.
"REGULAR USE" EXCLUSION DOES NOT APPLY ON THESE FACTS

Summary judgment on Farmers5 declaratory action was inappropriately granted,
where the plain language that Farmers cites in support of exclusion from coverage
does not, by its terms and under the facts, clearly exclude such coverage. The
pertinent portion ("Coverage C-1 Underinsured Motorist Coverage") of the policy
at issue provides that Farmers "will pay all sums which an insured person [Nicole
Valentine, here] is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or
operator [adverse driver, Robert Nielsen] of an underinsured motor vehicle..."
The policy further provides, in the section labeled "Additional Definitions Used in
This Part Only" that an "underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land
motor vehicle: ... (b) furnished or available for the regular use of you or any
family member."

Farmers' contention that the vehicle Nicole Valentine was operating may have
been "furnished or available for" her "regular use," does not create an exclusion
from coverage, because given the clear language of the pertinent provision
applicable under the facts, it is not the status of Nicole Valentine's vehicle which
is at issue. The "underinsured motor vehicle" is the tortfeasor's vehicle. That is,

the vehicle operated by Robert Nielsen, from whom she is entitled to recover
damages. Clearly the tortfeasor's vehicle was not "furnished or available for the
regular use" of Nicole Valentine or any family member. Accordingly, the
purported exclusion fails on its terms to exclude Valentine from coverage.

A. Factual Inquiry Unique to Case Required

At its heart, the interpretation of the clause purporting to exclude coverage for a
vehicle "furnished or available for the regular use" of the insured, is a factual
inquiry. It is clear that:
no hard and fast rule has been nor in the opinion of this Court can be
established for determining this question (what constitutes furnishing for
regular use) but that each case must stand or fall upon examination of the
facts in the particular case before the Court.
Bringle v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 169 NW2d 879 (Iowa 1969)

Clearly, the question of coverage in this case is not a "one-size fits all" simple
question of law. Unique factual circumstances of the case bear directly on
whether the purported exclusion as claimed, (assuming the language of the policy
is found to apply) is appropriately applied to bar plaintiffs from recovery.

B. "Regular Use" Clause Does Not Exclude Coverage

Although Farmers' discussion that some authorities that have construed the
"regular use" clauses of similar policies of insurance is instructive, it is not
conclusive given the unique facts of this case. The purported exclusion does not
operate to exclude coverage for the plaintiffs. On other similar factual
circumstances, courts have held that the vehicles in question in those cases were
not "furnished or available for the regular use" of the insured party.

In the case of Central Security Mutual Insurance Co. v. DePinto^ 673 P.2d 122
(Kan. App. 1984), Victoria DePinto was a nursing student at Hesston College,
where she participated with other students in clinical programs at hospitals in
nearby towns. To facilitate transportation of the students to the hospitals, the
college provided a van for DePinto to drive on Tuesdays and Wednesdays
throughout the college semester. Much like Nicole Valentine, DePinto did not
drive the same van every time she drove, she did not have her own keys to any of
the vans, but would pick up the keys from the office when she was ready to go.
She did not take the van home, she did not use it for any personal purposes, and
she did not have permission to use the van at any other time or for any other

purposes than driving to and from the hospitals. Id. at 123. On the facts of that
case, the court found that:

As to DePinto, it was not a continuous use, uninterrupted normal use for all
purposes, or without limitation as to use. Id. at 125.

The court, adopting the definition of "regular use" in Travelers Indemnity
Company v. Hudson, 488 P.2d 1008 (Ariz. App 1971), found it defined to mean
"continuous use; uninterrupted normal use for all purposes, without limitation as
to use; and customary use as opposed to occasional or special use". The court
found that, on the facts of the case before it, the "policy does provide coverage for
the accident in question." [Emphasis added]. DePinto at 125.

The court in DePinto also cites with approval the understanding of the phrase
"furnished for regular use" as implying:

'a right to the regular use of the automobile in the sense that there is an
express or implied understanding with the owner of an automobile that the
insured could have the use of the particular automobile5 at such time as he
desired, if available. Id., citing Wallace Co. v. State F.M. Auto Ins. Co.,
349 P.2d 789 (Or. 1960).

It is clear from the above-cited authorities that, contrary to the collection of
authorities cited by Farmers, there is a clear split of opinion as to whether the term
"furnished for regular use," as applied to facts similar to the case at bar would

operate to exclude coverage. Here, as in the Wallace and DePinto cases, Nicole
Valentine had no "right to the regular use of the automobile". There was no
express or implied understanding with the owner of the automobile that Valentine
could use the automobile at such time as she desired, if available. Her use of the
work truck was strictly circumscribed to allow only use at work and only use for
the purposes of her employer. Such use did not include the right to "regular use"
as understood and described above. On these facts, then, the phrase "furnished or
available for the regular use" of the insured does not operate to exclude coverage
for the Plaintiffs.
III.
CONSIDERATION OF UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, THE
VEHICLE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL
In the section of its brief labeled "Underinsured Motorist Coverage Follows the
Vehicle, Not The Individual," Farmers repeatedly misstates Valentine's position,
and then attempts to chisel away at the position it attributes to Valentine. See
Farmers5 Brief at 32-36. Never does Valentine take the position that UIM
coverage is or should be "floating personal accident insurance." That phrase
occurs once in Valentine's brief, in a quote from the Niswonger v. Farm Bureau
case, see Valentine's brief at 16. Nowhere does Valentine argue that this phrase

does reflect, or should be, the law in the State of Utah. Still Farmers, on at least
three occasions, credits Valentine with that position.

What Valentine tried to make clear is the incontrovertible point that underinsured
motorist coverage, by necessity and statutory mandate, must in some cases follow
and protect the insured individual. The Utah UIM statute, at 31A-22-305(10)d(i)A
requires that UIM coverage apply to a pedestrian injured by an underinsured
motorist. Obviously, the UIM coverage in the case of a pedestrian follows and
protects the insured pedestrian, despite Farmers5 adamant assertion that such
coverage only "follows the vehicle, not the individual". Similarly, an insured
individual who is a passenger in someone else's vehicle when injured by an
underinsured motorist can recover, again, showing the flaw in Farmers5
unqualified assertion that UIM coverage "follows the vehicle, not the individual.5'

The case Farmers relies on for the argument that the settled law in Utah is that UM
(and UIM) coverage "was intended to rest with the vehicle and not with the named
insured" is inapposite here. See Clark v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.^ 743
P.2d 1227 (Utah 1987). As Farmers acknowledges, the Clark case involves an
owned but uninsured vehicle, rather than a non-owned vehicle like Valentine was
using when she was injured. The difference is substantial.

Subsequent to Clark, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Bear River v Wright, 770
P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1989), explains the holding of Clark:

the Supreme Court held that... an automobile policy may exclude
from coverage a "vehicle" which is owned by the insured but is not
specifically named as an 'insured vehicle5 under the owner's policy.
The issue raised by appellant [in the Bear River case] is controlled
by the Clark decision. Id. [Emphasis added.]

In Clark, because he owned the vehicle, the decedent had every opportunity to
procure un- or underinsured motorist coverage on the vehicle he operated at the
time of his injury. The court found Clark's failure to insure that vehicle
controlling, and that his choice to obtain such coverage on one of his owned
vehicles but not on the vehicle he was operating at the time of the collision,
precluded coverage.

Here, Valentine had no opportunity or option to insure the vehicle she drove at the
time of her injury. She had no insurable interest in the vehicle. Valentine's
circumstance is substantially dissimilar to that in Clark, where the insured owned
the vehicle he was operating, and he, Clark, could have, but failed to, obtain
uninsured motorist coverage on his use of that vehicle.

The quote selected by Farmers from the Clark opinion is instructive: "If the
legislature had intended to require uninsured motorist coverage only on one
vehicle per household, it would have drafted the statute accordingly and would
not have required the insurers to offer the coverage on all vehicles." Id. at 1229.
[Emphasis added.] Clearly our legislature did intend that an individual's purchase
of underinsured motorist coverage would protect the insured individual against
the risk of injury caused by an underinsured motorist. The legislature even went
so far as to mandate a circumstance wherein the UIM coverage follows the
individual, away from the insured vehicle, in the case of a pedestrian. The facts
here are more analogous to the situation where an individual is injured outside of
the insured vehicle, such as a pedestrian injured by an underinsured motorist,
rather than to the situation in Clark where the insured is injured while operating
another vehicle owned by the injured insured.

It is important to note the final words in the sentence in Clark from which Farmers
draws its argument: "coverage was intended to rest with the vehicle and not the
named insured since owners can opt in favor of uninsured motorist coverage
on some vehicles and against it on others." Id. at 1229, 1230. [Emphasis
added.] The court in Clark was concerned with the "owned vehicle" exclusion,
and had no connection to the "regular use" exclusion at issue here.

The facts here are dissimilar enough that the dictum of the Clark opinion does not
apply. For a few weeks before the crash that injured her, while on her job,
Valentine drove a vehicle owned by her employer. While Farmers places great
emphasis on Valentine's recurring use of her employer's vehicle, the truth is,
Valentine only used the vehicle less than twenty percent of her total weekly hours.

The availability of the vehicle to Valentine may have been somewhat regular (that
is, for some number of hours between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., five days a week),
but given her total available time per week, the vehicle was provided to her only a
fraction of her time. That is, out of 168 total hours in the week, Valentine had the
use of her employer's vehicle approximately 30 hours per week. Clearly, reading
the term "regular use" in its sense as "customary, usual, or typical," the
inescapable conclusion is that a vehicle available to an individual for 20% of the
time, and only for restricted purposes, all of which serve the employer's benefit, is
not "furnished or available" for "regular use."

It is beyond dispute that the legislature did not create a scheme of underinsured
motorist coverage in which the coverage rests only and always with the insured
vehicle, and never follows the insured individual. The case at bar presents a

factual scenario wherein the coverage should properly cover and protect the
insured individual, a person who had no reasonable opportunity to obtain
additional underinsured motorist coverage on a vehicle owned by her employer,
nor was she aware of any need to do so, where she only used the vehicle some
20% of the time and only for her employer's benefit.

Conclusion and Relief Sought

Valentine submits that the conclusions of the trial court are incorrect as a matter of
law, and this court should properly reverse the summary judgment founded upon
those conclusions. The phrase at issue in the endorsement upon which Farmers
relies for denying coverage is ambiguous. An ambiguity in an insurance contract
must be read most favorably to the insured, and thus in favor of coverage.
Moreover, the endorsement upon which Farmers relies for denying coverage does
not follow the mandates of Utah law in limiting underinsured motorist coverage,
adds unnecessary and confusing words, and is void as against public policy.
Finally, the exclusionary clause is inapplicable on the facts presented in this
matter, in that Valentine did not have the employer's vehicle "furnished or
available for [her] regular use". For all these reasons, Appellants respectfully

request this court reverse the Order granting Summary Judgment in favor of
Appellee Farmers.
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